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ABSTRACT. Presales have been used as a major financing mode for real estate development 
in China. However, there have been limited researches studying the roles of different real es-
tate market players impacting on the efficiency of the property presales, in particular, on the 
issue of asymmetric information in the market. The paper adopted an institutional approach 
to study the problems latent in the presale property market. Semi-structured interviews with 
professionals and industry practitioners were conducted and the findings suggested that the 
lack of market information, pseudo policy objectives and confusing roles played by major 
market players are the root of the problems. Restructuring of the institutional arrangement 
in regard to the financial channels for capital, risk management on developers, custody of the 
presale proceeds and commitment of the regulatory authorities are necessary in enhancing 
the market efficiency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
There have been dramatic institutional chang-
es in the operation of residential property 
markets in recent years and the most nota-
ble change is the increasing use of property 
presales. Presale arrangement of uncompleted 
residential property has been adopted as the 
prime mode of sales by developers to alleviate 
financial burden, in particular, when the cost 
of debt-financing is high (Chan et al., 2008; 
Wong, 2012). Furthermore, presale is found 
to be an effective tool for developers to reduce 
their exposure of risk if the absorption rates in 
the market are below expectations by the time 
when the properties are completed (Buttimer 
et al., 2008; Wong, 2012). The presale mode 
is particularly popular in cities with high-rise 
apartments and large housing developments 
which require substantial development capi-
tal (Lai et al., 2004; Leung et al., 2007a; Cao 
et al., 2008; Zhong, 2005). However, presale 
property markets are commonly found highly 
inefficient due to the asymmetric information 
problem in trading uncompleted properties of 
which buyers do not have the chance to inspect 
the trading properties that are under construc-
tion, whereas the developers who undertake 
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the construction must possess more informa-
tion. When possession of information between 
the two parties in the trade is not aligned, the 
developer may have incentives to act against 
the interest of the buyers in the construction 
to generate a higher economic rent, thus moral 
hazard problem is created (Chau et al., 2007; 
Choy and Chau, 2006; Lai et al., 2004; Leung 
et al., 2007b, 2010). 
In Mainland China, more than 50% of new-
ly constructed commercial residential proper-
ties were sold through presales and the ratio 
were even over 90% in some counties (Zhong, 
2005), and problems generated from informa-
tion asymmetry in the presale property mar-
ket have also caused public concerns. There 
were cases that developers allied with proper-
ty agents to hoard up properties and speculate 
on the prices by releasing fictitious informa-
tion. It was common that when presale buy-
ers collected their properties upon completion, 
problems such as smaller size of the proper-
ties, mismatch of fittings and finishes were 
found. The problems were so severe that in the 
2004 Real Estate Financial Report, the Peo-
ple’s Bank of China questioned whether the 
presale policy should be replaced by only sales 
of completed properties (Kalifa, 2005). A sur-
vey conducted by the Consumer’s Association 
in Sichuan (Zhong, 2005) showed that 7,623 
complaints filed from 2003 to 2005 in regard 
to sales of commercial properties, 6632 cases 
were related to presales, accounting for 91.3% 
of the total cases reported. Vice Minister of 
the China Ministry of Construction, Mr. Gi Ji, 
remarked that among the problems latent in 
the property market, those found in the pre-
sale process were the most (Research in Chi-
na, 2008). Furthermore, according to the Real 
Estate Web Report, defaults of construction, 
poor built quality, unclear and exclusions of 
liabilities in the contracts were common risks 
that presale property buyers had to bear in 
Mainland China (Research in China, 2008). 
Considering the eminent problems brought 
about by presales, local government in Nan-
ning attached to Guangxi Province suspended 
the presale policy in 2010 (TBW, 2010). 
To tackle the problems, the central gov-
ernment promulgated a series of regulations 
aiming to remove mal-practices and improve 
the transparency of information. The most 
prominent one was the Regulations on Sales of 
Commodity Houses with Instant Marked Price 
promulgated in May 2011. It requires develop-
ers to apply the ‘one house one price’ policy 
that the price of each unit in the presales must 
be stated clearly in a price list when applying 
for the Presale Permit. The price list must also 
be published in the government’s website and 
developers must strictly adhere to the price 
list when conducting presales. Despite the 
stern requirement, developers still found coun-
ter-measures by assigning a high-price when 
applying for the Presale Permit and then gave 
discount privately to individual buyer during 
presales making an illusion that the buyer was 
getting preferential treatment. As such, there 
were incidents that some buyers had paid a 
price relatively higher than the others on simi-
lar units in such “secret” deals, and in return, 
complaints were lodged by those paid a higher 
price. Similar problems were found not only 
in China, but also in many developed coun-
tries such as Singapore, Hong Kong, London 
and the U.S. with different extent of severity 
(Kalifa, 2005; Buang, 2006). A comparison of 
the different practices of property presales has 
been made in Leung et al. (2007a). 
2. EFFICIENCY OF PROPERTY 
PRESALES FROM INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE
A number of researches have been conducted 
to study the efficiency of property markets, 
among them, the information efficiency ap-
proach has been found to be commonly em-
ployed (Brown and Matysiak, 2000). However, 
North (1990) pointed out that these studies 
were inadequate since they had isolated the 
use of information and failed to link this with 
issues arising from operation and allocative 
efficiency impacting the market. Since opera-
tion efficiency is concerned with the market 
processes and allocative efficiency refers to 
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deployment of the resources, North (2005) ad-
vocated using the institutional perspective in 
assessing the market efficiency which takes 
into account of not only the information but 
also the specific characteristics of property 
itself and the operational features of market 
activity (Coase, 1998; D’Arcy and Keogh, 1997; 
North, 2005). 
According to Keogh and D’Arcy (1999), 
the institutional regime of a property market 
constitutes the rules of games, governing the 
market activity including the ways of business 
interactions and knowledge acquisitions. The 
governance structure and institution struc-
ture might be partially beneficial to particular 
market participants of developers, government 
and consumers, depending on their bargaining 
powers. Developers, who possess monopoly 
control of property information behind their 
wealth-maximizing behavior, would naturally 
have the intention to induce biased competi-
tion on their advantage (North, 2005). North 
described developer as astute perceivers to 
any subtle institutional changes and convert 
the changes to their competitive advantages 
and eventually capitalizing on the imperfec-
tion arising from restricting the accessibility to 
information and delivery of “quality-imparted 
information” (D’Arcy and Keogh, 1998; North, 
2005). The situation is more intense in pre-
sales market in which the level of severity of 
asymmetric information is much higher. 
Along the growing importance of real estate 
development to economic stability of many ar-
eas (Lisheng, 2010; Tang, et al., 2006), the gov-
ernments have adopted a prudent attitude to 
reign the market through the use of rules and 
regulations (Keogh and D’Arcy, 1999; Leung 
et al., 2010; North, 2005; Whitehead, 1983). 
However, implementation of the measures so 
as their effectiveness have been complicated 
by the institutional regime which include the 
social value of the community, the housing pro-
vision, economic and political changes. China, 
in a transitional market economy, have been 
criticized for the lack of full market rules and 
effective market enforcement in which the pos-
session of guanxi (personal relationship) with 
government officials and market players is a 
determinant factor in a success of business 
(Tang et al., 2006; Leung et al. 2011; Wang 
and Chen, 2010). Incidents such as land hoard-
ing and unethical presale practices could be at-
tributed to the institutional factors which in-
clude ineffective enforcement of the regulatory 
measures against fraudulent practices, increas-
ing lucrative profits that could be generated 
from property development, switching from 
spot-sales of completed properties to presales 
of uncompleted properties and poor accessibil-
ity of information in the presale market. 
The paper aimed to examine the efficiency 
of the presale residential property market in 
Mainland China by exploring the market ac-
tivities using an institutional approach, in 
particular, in addressing the questions of what 
the root of the problems latent in the institu-
tional system are and the factors critical to the 
development of the presale property market. 
The data were collected from field investiga-
tion conducted in Shenzhen and Guangzhou 
between 2009 and 2011. These two cities were 
selected as they are among the first-tier cit-
ies in which the presale property markets are 
more mature compared to the lower-tier cit-
ies. The study started with a comprehensive 
review of the institutional features of the pre-
sale property market which included the fi-
nancing channel, the administrative and regu-
latory system and the role played by different 
major market actors. An extensive survey of 
120 semi-structured interviews with consum-
ers, professionals and developers were then 
conducted to identify the root of the problems 
latent in the institutional system hindering a 
healthy operation of the presale market. Fi-
nally, the set of factors which are critical in 
enhancing the efficiency of the presale prop-
erty market are recommended. 
3. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF THE 
PRESALE PROPERTY MARKET IN 
MAINLAND CHINA 
3.1. Financing channel
Direct financing channel for real estate devel-
opment in Mainland China is narrow and a 
majority of the fund comes from banks. Ac-
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cording to the 2008 Real Estate Financial 
Report (Research in China, 2008), there were 
three main sources of development funds in 
real estate market, i.e., 35% owned by devel-
opers; 18.4% from bank loans and 43.1% from 
proceeds collected from presales (Figure 1). In 
reality, the reliance on bank lending for the 
development should be much heavier, which 
could be as high as over 50%, because most 
funds from developers were in fact personal 
borrowings from banks. Initial Public offer-
ing (IPO) for financing development capital is 
not easy as the government set up high per-
formance threshold and stringent approval 
procedures. Most medium-and-small sized de-
velopers cannot reach the listing requirements 
except state-owned companies and super-size 
enterprises. 
The growing importance of the use of pre-
sales as a major financing tool has been exac-
erbated by the macro-policies employed by the 
central government in tightening bank lend-
ing to property development and controlling 
foreign investment in real estate. In 2003, the 
People’s Bank of China issued the notice which 
requires the reserve of developers to be not less 
than 30% of the gross investment of the pro-
ject, the loans for land acquisition should not 
be more than 70% of the land appraised value 
and the repayment of the loan should not be 
more than 2 years. The Opinion on Regulating 
Foreign Investment in Real Estate Industry 
was promulgated in 2006 and the Administra-
tion was enacted in 2007 which restrict foreign 
investments from development of large tract 
land and spectacular projects. In 2008, the Cir-
cular for Strengthening Commercial Property 
Loan Management was released jointly by the 
People’s Bank of China and the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission to raise the threshold 
of loans for residential property development. 
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Figure 1. Capital for real estate development 
Source: Research in China (2008)
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eign investment in China’s real estate market, 
property developers are inevitably compelled 
to seek other financing channels. 
Another incentive using presales is the 
boost of profit from saving arising from the 
reduced borrowing from banks. Wang (2005) 
reported a case of high-rise residential project 
built between 2003 and 2005, the presales 
were conducted in mid-2004. The total invest-
ment capital was RMB50 million of which 36% 
being developers’ own funds, 20% from bank 
borrowings and 44% from proceeds collected 
from presales. It was assessed that by using 
presales, the pre-tax return was much higher 
at 30%, comparing to only 4% if the properties 
were sold only upon completion. The boost of 
profit was attributed to the substantial saving 
from bank interest. 
3.2. Administration system of the presale 
property market
The administration system of the presale prop-
erty market in China follows a top-down hier-
archy shown in Figure 2.
At the highest level, the Ministry of Hous-
ing and Urban-Rural Development of the 
State Council centrally administers presales 
of commercial properties throughout the coun-
try through promulgation of law and policies, 
whereas the administrative departments of 
provinces and autonomous regions, munici-
palities and counties in charge of construction 
and/or real property administer and oversee 
presales of commercial properties within their 
administrative regions in accordance to the 
law and policies promulgated from the highest. 
Each administrative area has its local author-
ity, mostly known as the Real Property Admin-
istration Department, to undertake property 
transaction registration and oversee the use of 
the presale proceeds (Cao, 2009). 
Although administration of the presale 
property market follows a top-down hierarchi-
cal structure, the legislative system from the 
top is very slow in responding to the need of the 
local markets. This is on one hand due to the 
continental size of the country that socio-eco-
nomic differences are wide among local areas, 
and thus provincial adjustments are required 
in implementation of the central policies. On 
the other hand, it is also the aim of the central 
government to maintain a set of flexible rules 
to deal with changes in both the social and 
economic environments. In order to promote 
the market-oriented real estate developments 
while recognizing local differences, the central 
government has delegated substantial fiscal 
autonomy to local governments since 1980s 
and tolerated a relatively high degree of self-
interest pursuit (Cao, 2009). This unique style 
of governance has provided huge incentives to 
local authorities to exploit resources and ex-
plore development opportunities in the local 
areas by adopting the doctrine of pragmatism. 
Although this approach helped exacerbate the 
economic growth of China, the central govern-
ment has often become ineffective to ensure its 
policies and directive to be fully followed at the 
local level (Cao, 2009). 
Many local governments pushed forward 
real estate developments without following the 
rules and procedures in order to generate lu-
crative revenue from sales of land and the asso-
ciated taxes. For example, Collectively-Owned 
Land in villages in China is not allowed for 
construction of commercial buildings unless it 
has been converted into State-Owned Land. 
However, pilot projects were launched in Bei-
jing in 2004 and Guangdong in 2005 to build 
commercial housings on collective land known 
as Town Title or Petty Title properties for buy-
and-sell. These buyers could not get a legiti-
mate title of the properties since the use-rights 
on Collective-Owned Land could not be trans-
ferred. Informal statistics showed that these 
properties accounted for 20% of the total com-
mercial properties in Beijing, 25% to 30% in 
Xian, 40% to 50% in Shenzhen in 2007 (Wang 
and Chen, 2010) and the percentages have been 
growing. More recently, the Ministry of Land 
Resources noted the seriousness of the problem 
and asked for a halt of a petty title project in 
Wai Yau district of Beijing in 2010, similar in-
cident happened again in 2011 in Ping Cheong 
district in 2011 (JRJ, 2011). 
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Figure 2. Top-down administration system of China’s presale property market
3.3. Fund management in real estate 
development projects
The solid arrows shown in Figure 3 illustrate 
the flow of funds of a real estate development 
project under the formal institutional setting 
of the real estate market in China. To start a 
development project, developers are required to 
settle the payments for land acquisition such as 
the land grant fee and the stamp duty within a 
certain period of time, usually within one year 
after the purchase. The cost is usually around 
30% to 40% of the total development cost, but 
the land use fees of some prime lands can 
reach as high as over 60%. Once the permit 
for construction and other related documents 
are granted, the developer may apply for loans 
from banks for carrying out the construction 
(Gao, 2007). The size of loan would depend on 
the project size, the amount of capital required 
and the bargaining power of the developer. Pre-
sales permit can be applied upon completion of 
2/3 of the major buildings. The proceeds col-
lected from presales shall be used to complete 
the construction and settle the other outstand-
ing payments. The use of the funds shall be 
overseen by the local property registration 
authority until the delivery of the completed 
properties.
The fund-flow system above appeared 
straight-forward, however, the institutional 
arrangement has been complicated by not only 
the political interest but also the social belief 
  
State Council
Provinces and Autonomous Regions
Municipalities and Counties
Overseeing the use of presale proceeds
Administration of property presales
Local property registration authority
and economic push which govern the ways of 
business interaction and knowledge acquisi-
tion in the market. As a result of ineffective 
central control and high autonomy delegated to 
local authorities, local real estate markets have 
been characterized by self-interest pursuit lo-
cal policies, high power concentration and low 
information transparency (Cao, 2009). Al-
though it is stipulated that land premium and 
land use fee must be settled within the period 
prescribed, developers who have guanxi with 
the local officials are able to defer the payment 
until completion of the project. It was reported 
that the pre-tax return of a real estate develop-
ment was boosted from 33% to 111% attributed 
to both the deferred payment of land premium 
and use of presales to finance the upfront capi-
tal (Wong, 2012). In addition, many developers 
started presales before the Permit was granted, 
especially in non-first tier cities. In regard to 
the loans from banks, many developers chose 
to use part of the funds to purchase new land 
to start another project because they request-
ed the construction companies (contractors) to 
make pre-payment on the construction (dotted 
arrows of Figure 3). Although this practice is 
prohibited by law, due to intense competition in 
the construction industry, many construction 
companies agreed with the pre-payment ar-
rangement in order to secure the construction 
and be reimbursed when the properties were 
sold later. 
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Figure 3. Flow of funds in a real estate development project
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3.4. Property presale regulatory system
The property presale regulatory system in the 
Mainland follows a 3-level institutional hierar-
chy. At the top level, the central government 
promulgates central policies for the market 
players to adhere to as mentioned above. In 
the middle level, a three-pronged administra-
tion system is adopted by local authorities to 
regulate the market which includes the use 
of administrative measures, self-disciplinary 
undertakings and public supervision with the 
aim to protect the rights of buyers/consumers 
in the third level (Figure 4). 
Level 1: Regulatory measures imposed by 
the central government. Different measures 
have been introduced by the central govern-
ment to enhance the disclosure of information 
and enforcement of presale regulations. For 
example, the Administration of Urban Real 
Property Law was enacted by the Committee 
of National People’s Congress to standardize 
the custody of commercial properties in 1994. 
Subsequently in the same year, the Admin-
istration of the Presale of Urban Commodity 
Procedures was issued to regulate the presale 
practices of uncompleted properties. In 2001, 
the Presale Procedures was further defined 
in the bylaws. They were revised again in 
2004 which clearly stipulate that developers 
must not pre-sell commercial properties with-
out Presale Permit and must adhere to the 
requirements stated in the Administration 
(Wang, 2008; Xu and Yang, 2006). In 2011, 
to further enhance information transparency, 
the requirement of Instant Marked Price was 
promulgated which requires developer to state 
the price of each unit when applying for a Pre-
sale Permit. 
Level 2: Three-pronged approach in regu-
lating local market. In the implementation 
stage in level 2, local governments adopt the 
three-pronged check-and-balance approach, 
i.e. through the local administrative meas-
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ures adapted from the regulations and poli-
cies promulgated by the central government, 
the China Commercial Real Estate Association 
(CCREA) and China Consumers’ Association 
(CCA) can on one hand protect the interest of 
property buyers, and on the other hand, avoid 
fettering the market operation. 
Local authorities are often given the discre-
tionary power to adapt the rules and regula-
tions promulgated by the central government 
to suit local circumstances. Although the dis-
cretionary power has enhanced the flexibility 
of local governments and ensure necessary 
government revenue, it brought along nega-
tive impacts such that preferential treatments 
given to developers when disputes arisen from 
property presales. 
The CCREA is a national association ap-
proved by the government representing the 
commercial real estate industry with the 
aim to mitigate transaction costs in the mar-
ket and to enhance the image of developers. 
It promulgates self-regulatory measures to 
guide its developer members on the conduct of 
property presales, however, the effectiveness 
is questionable since the key missions explic-
itly stated by the CCREA are “protecting the 
legal rights of its members, giving advice to 
government agencies in policy-making policies 
and representing the industry in liaising with 
local authorities” before protecting the interest 
of property buyers. 
In regard to CCA, this is a monitoring insti-
tution overseeing the operation of the market 
and looking after the benefits of consumers. It 
aims to enhance consumers’ rights within the 
legal framework. CCA has publicly criticized 
the unethical presale practices of developers 
in the mass media. They also meet the market 
participants, such as the CCREA, regularly to 
reflect the complaints made by the public and 
to look for remedial actions. However, CCA 
has not been delegated with legislative power 
to enforce the protection measures.
Level 3: Bargaining power of presale prop-
erty buyers. The bargaining power of presale 
property buyers is related to access of accurate 
information, education and wealth of people. 
Problem of access to accurate information in 
the presale property market is serious as dis-
cussed before. This is on one hand due to de-
velopers’ taking advantage from manipulating 
the information, on the other hand, poor trans-
parency of market information is also resulted 
from slow and incomplete information issued 
by local governments. Furthermore, there is 
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also deficiency in the real estate education 
(Cao, 2009) partially caused by the central 
government when the Ministry of Education 
cancelled real estate education as an under-
graduate programme in 1998. Given the weak 
bargaining power and the costly legal proceed-
ings, individual buyer usually could do little 
when dispute arises. 
4. PROBLEMS LATENT IN THE 
INSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY PRESALE 
SYSTEM 
In order to identify the major problems latent 
in the presale market, 120 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted to members of the 
three-level institutional hierarchy of major 
market players, i.e., consumers from the public 
representing the interest of the general presale 
property buyers, representatives from profes-
sional institutions and members from develop-
ment companies in Shenzhen and Guangzhou. 
Among them, 58 consumers were invited ran-
domly from different academic institutions to 
join the interviews, 27 from construction pro-
fessionals and 35 from developers who were 
referred by different professional institutions 
and developers through personal contact. 
The questions set out for the interviews 
were divided into two parts. Section A includ-
ed a number of risk factors identified from the 
literature review with the aim to assess their 
importance. The respondents were asked to 
rank the seriousness of different types of pre-
sale risks from 1 to 5 according to the follow-
ing classification: 
1 – the risk was not apparent;
2 – the risk posed a problem but the degree 
was not serious;
3 – the risk was apparent and the impact 
was serious in some developments;
4 – the risk was imminent and the impact 
caused concern of the parties involved;
5 – the risk was imminent and the impact 
was very serious and caused public concern.
Section B contained open questions for ex-
amining the root of the problems and identi-
fied the critical factors affecting the develop-
ment of the presale property market which 
included the roles of the different bodies, i.e. 
the government, REDA, CC and EAA, should 
play within the institutional system.
Presale risk factors
The overall ratings of the risk factors, ranging 
from 3.00 to 3.88, showed that all the presale 
risks as identified in Table 1 were considered 
apparent in the market. Among them, deficient 
housing quality, delayed delivery and develop-
ment default were ranked the top three most 
serious presale risks with an overall average 
rating of 3.88, 3.86 and 3.39 respectively, i.e. 
the risks were considered imminent and the 
impact caused concern of the parties involved. 
Although exaggeration of saleable areas, un-
qualified for property certificates and the use 
of unethical presale tactics were considered 
less serious, the ratings were considered high 
at 3.20, 3.17 and 3.07, i.e. the risks were ap-
parent and the impacts were serious in some 
developments. Features mismatch was being 
rated the least serious but the score was also 
high at 3.00. Regarding the ratings given by 
different interest groups, they were not much 
different ranging from 2.82 to 4.03 which 
showed that the views shared among differ-
ent stakeholders in regard to the risks were 
similar. Besides ranking of different types of 
presale risks, a number of interesting and dis-
tinctive insights were also gathered from the 
interviews which are discussed in the follow-
ing sections.
Deficient Housing Quality. It was interest-
ing to find that not only consumers but also 
developers considered deficient housing qual-
ity of presale properties the most serious prob-
lem in the market at a rating close to 4, with 
that of professionals at a slightly lower rating 
of 3.62. Many developers in Mainland China 
opted for a low-cost strategy and therefore the 
quality of the developments was always found 
substandard, in particular, in presale prop-
erties as buyers were not able to inspect the 
properties before purchase. Moreover, it was a 
common phenomenon that developers who un-
dertook several projects concurrently but with 
limited funding had to lower the costs by using 
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inferior materials and cheapest workmanship 
in order to keep all projects going. It is stipu-
lated in the Application of Laws Concerning 
Commercial Housing Contract that buyers are 
entitled to request for termination of the con-
tract and compensation if sub-standard qual-
ity from the building is found. However, proof 
of sub-standard quality must be validated by 
an authorized person, and the buyer must be 
prepared for the time and effort to go through 
the long-judicial process. Although presale 
property carries warranty period, it is not al-
ways effective especially with small develop-
ers. Incidents showed that rectification works 
were often delayed until the warranty period 
expired in an attempt to avoid the liability. 
Delayed Delivery. The ratings on delayed 
delivery from different stakeholders were simi-
lar to that of deficient quality which reflected 
that the risk of delayed delivery was consid-
ered serious and caused concern. According to 
the interviews, there were two main reasons 
attributed to the problem of delay apart from 
bad weather. In order to promote an early-sale 
of the buildings, developers often adopted a 
tight construction schedule which was difficult 
to meet. Furthermore, the fitting of electricity, 
water supply and other building services had 
to be undertaken by assigned sub-contractors, 
utility companies and the property company. 
The delay of completion was very often caused 
by late arrangement of the fittings with dif-
ferent parties of the works. If disputes arose 
among them, further delay would be caused. 
Although it was stipulated in the presale con-
tract that buyers were entitled for compensa-
tion for the delay, in reality, developers often 
denied their responsibility through loopholes 
since the compensation terms contained in 
the contract were vague without stating clear-
ly the penalty involved. There were cases in 
which the buyers gave up the claims because 
they did not have the time and resources to 
support a lawsuit against the giant developer. 
Development Default. Both consumers and 
developers gave development default a rating 
close to 3 which showed that the risk was ap-
parent in the market and serious in some de-
velopments. It was surprising that the rating 
given by professionals was even higher. From 
the information collected, the slack of capital 
custody was the undermining problem of the 
development default. It is mandatory that a 
designated local authority should be respon-
sible for overseeing the use of the proceeds 
collected in accordance with the Administra-
tion of the Presale of Urban Commodity Pro-
cedures, however, the amount is restricted to 
the deposits taken in the preliminary sales 
and purchases only. Furthermore, details on 
the administration of the use of proceeds and 
the penalty imposed on mis-behaved develop-
ers are not stated in the legislation. Although 
more stringent requirements on capital custo-
dy are exercised in areas such as Chongqing, 
Guangdong and Jinan in which the capital 
custody are overseen by an assigned bank or 
an appointed construction supervision com-
pany, the measures are not unified (Wong et 
al., 2004). 
Exaggeration of Saleable Areas. Most re-
spondents regarded the problem apparent in 
the market at an overall average rating of 3.2, 
and it was particularly serious in some devel-
Table 1. Rating of the seriousness of the risk factors by different interest groups
Rating Risk factor Consumers Professionals Developers Overall 
1 Deficient housing quality 3.98 3.62 4.03 3.88
2 Delayed delivery 3.92 3.65 4.01 3.86
3 Development default 3.11 4.01 3.06 3.39
4 Exaggeration of saleable areas 3.76 2.82 3.01 3.20
5 Unethical presale tactics 3.61 2.85 3.05 3.17
6 Unqualified for House Certificate 3.21 3.09 2.91 3.07
7 Features mismatch 2.98 2.87 3.15 3.00
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opments. The root of the problem was attrib-
uted to the lack of a standard measurement on 
floor areas and the descriptions contained in 
presale brochures in regard to floor areas were 
often misleading. It is the practice in the in-
dustry that the measurement of saleable areas 
consists of two parts: the internal floor area of 
the unit and the apportionment of the common 
areas. Developers tried to exaggerate the sale-
able areas by boosting the common areas in 
order to raise the house prices. The efficiency 
rate of the usable floor area of residential prop-
erties lately built was getting lower in between 
70% and 80%. Although it is mandatory in the 
presale contract that compensation must be 
rendered to buyers if the saleable area of the 
complete property differs from what is stated 
in the contract by a variation of over 3%, the 
compensation has never been rendered due to 
lack of a standard measurement rule. 
Unethical Presale Tactics. In regard to the 
use of unethical presale tactics, most consum-
ers considered the problem serious and caused 
public concern with an average rating of 3.6, 
whereas both developers and professionals 
also considered the problem apparent and par-
ticularly serious in some developments. For ex-
ample, misleading information was contained 
in presale promotion materials to exaggerate 
the quality of the buildings, presales of un-
completed properties without Presale Permit, 
inaccurate price list and transaction informa-
tion were given. Even worse, there were cas-
es where the potential buyers were provided 
with false information on the mortgage ar-
rangement and, at the end, they were not able 
to get a mortgage after the presale deal was 
closed. Some unscrupulous developers even re-
peatedly presold the same property to several 
buyers (Wang, 2005). According to Article 13 
of the Administration of the Presale of Urban 
Commodity Procedures, a fine will be imposed 
if developers conducted the presales without 
meeting the prescribed rules and regulations. 
However, the fine of less than 1% of the pro-
ceeds collected or not exceeding RMB30,000 is 
just too little to deter the mal-practices of de-
velopers. From the interview, Vice President 
of CCREA, Guangzhou, Mr. Pan Shujian, re-
marked that he had never heard of any devel-
opers being punished because of mal-practices 
in conducting property presales.
Unqualified for House Certificate. Most re-
spondents from different stakeholders consid-
ered the risk apparent, and this was particu-
lar serious in small-scale developments. There 
were three common phenomena for developers 
not being able to get a House Certificate as 
follows: 
1. the houses were built on Collectively-
Owned Land;
2. the completed properties could not get 
the Certificate of Completion Acceptance;
3. the houses were repeatedly sold or mort-
gaged.
The houses being sold or mortgaged repeat-
edly were found as one of the main reasons of 
House Certificates not being granted. On the 
other hand, 71% of the respondents believed 
that those houses which could not get the 
Certificate of Completion Acceptance because 
they were not well-equipped to get through 
the examinations such as protection against 
fire and structural problems. It was also in-
teresting to find that some developers inten-
tionally failed to apply for the Certificate of 
Completion Acceptance in some cases. When 
the housing market was in a surge, developers 
tried all means to induce the buyers to give up 
their presales so that developers could re-sell 
the properties at a higher price in the market. 
In regard to houses built on Collective Land, 
most respondents attributed the problem to 
the lack of information available in the mar-
ket for public scrutiny. It should be noted that 
in Mainland China, Collective Land means the 
land that is collectively owned by rural collec-
tive economic organizations. These lands are 
not allowed for commercial purpose until they 
have been converted into state-owned land. 
Hence, houses built on Collective Land can 
never be able to get the House Certificate for 
transfer of the property rights. 
Features Mismatch. The problem of fea-
tures mismatch was ranked the lowest among 
all the presale risks identified with an overall 
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average rating of 3. Respondents from all the 
3 different groups of stakeholders regarded 
the problem as apparent, but it was serious 
in only some developments. In Mainland Chi-
na, most houses were used to sell with only 
basic features in form of adobe houses and, 
therefore, features mismatch would not be a 
problem on presales of adobe houses. However, 
developers started to offer decoration with ex-
tra fittings and fixtures in selling properties 
in recent years to attract prospective buyers. 
It was not uncommon that the features and 
fittings turned out to be different from what 
had been promised such as the brands, types 
and quality of floor tiles, door panels and locks, 
sanitary sets and others. Some developers in 
Shenzhen charged a low price to promote their 
houses with decoration. However, the decora-
tion quality was so inferior that, for example, 
the expected wooden floor tile was replaced by 
leatheroid. Despite the Detailed Rules for Im-
plementation of Decorating Commodity House 
was issued by the Ministry of Construction in 
2002, mismatch of fittings and features were 
often found. 
5. ROOT OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE 
PRESALE PROPERTY INSTITUTION
Upon examination of the institutional system 
and the information collected from the survey 
in regard to property presales, the root of the 
problems latent hindering the operation of the 
market can be attributed to the following:
Opaque market information. 73.4% respond-
ents from the survey found that the opaque 
presale market information is the most serious 
problem. For example, no measure has been 
taken by the government or the CCA to pub-
licize the transaction information of property 
presales, nor the information about the house 
price, house areas and the facilities. Further-
more, the government has done little in miti-
gating the asymmetric information problem 
in the market and, with biased information, 
the sense of contract bonding in the market 
is weak. Furthermore, the use of the proceeds 
collected from the presales is not transparent. 
An independent credit system overseeing the 
proceeds collected has been set up recently but 
its effectiveness is yet to assess. 
Pseudo policy objectives of governments. 
Despite a series of policies have been under-
taken to formalize the presale procedures, 
the authorities tend to favor developers in 
the policy-making and have not been fully 
committed to enforcing the measures to safe-
guard the rights of presale property buyers. It 
is largely due to the fact that the real estate 
market has made a significant contribution to 
the GDP and tax revenues required for run-
ning the government. In 2007, the real estate 
market contributed 5.82% of the total GDP in 
Mainland China, and the land revenue also 
accounted for more than 50% of the total gov-
ernment revenue. Furthermore, the economic 
growth of the area is treated as part of the 
performance index of the local authority, the 
higher the growth of the real estate market in 
the area often symbolizing the better perfor-
mance of the local officials. 
Confusing roles of market players. Regard-
ing the role of CCREA and CCA, they are only 
self-regulatory institutes who are responsible 
for reflecting the complaints of consumers such 
as contract deceits and false advertisements to 
the related parties and the governmental de-
partments. However, they do not possess any 
legislative power to enforce developers to com-
ply with the guidelines in conducting presales. 
In reality, CCREA provides guidelines primar-
ily aim at protecting the interests of its devel-
oper members. There were also incidents that 
CCA was being pressured to hide information 
which were unfavorable to developers. 
6. CRITICAL FACTORS FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESALE 
MARKET 
Important insights were also drawn from the 
study to identify the set of factors critical to 
the development of the institutional system of 
property presales in Mainland China which 
are discussed as follows:
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Financing means. So far, the finance for 
most real estate developments in China is re-
stricted to bank loans and upfront capital from 
presales. In order to control the credit risks, 
it is necessary to expand the financial chan-
nels through product innovation. The develop-
ment of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) 
started in the Mainland China in recent years 
and the channel through asset- and mortgage-
backed securitization is not available. The lack 
of a well established real estate finance market 
pushes developers to higher financial difficul-
ties and thus development default would also 
be higher. Only with innovation of real estate 
financial means can help channel funds from 
the institutional investors to support a sustain-
able development of the real estate industry 
(Xu and Yang, 2006). 
Risk management on presale proceeds. To 
protect the proceeds collected from presale 
property buyers, different countries set up dif-
ferent systems over the custody of the funds, for 
example, Financial Performance Guarantees 
for escrow in America, The Estate Transaction 
Guarantee System set up in Japan, and the 
Housing Implementation and Guarantee Sys-
tem in Thailand. Similar escrow system should 
also be set up in China in which a financial 
institution as the trusted third party should 
be appointed to act as the custodian overseeing 
the funds deposited in the bank. The power of 
the custodian must also be limited to release 
to the developer only the sum certified by the 
authorized person as having been expended on 
the building. The third party should be respon-
sible for monitoring the cash flow direction, use 
of funds, project’s development conditions and 
releasing the escrowed capitals to developers 
when reaching the escrow requirement. As 
such, the custody of the funds could be jointly 
controlled by the custodian, the bank and the 
authorized person.
Risk management on developers. Credibil-
ity of developers is of utmost importance to the 
risk management in real estate development 
in China and the transparency of the finance 
management of borrowers is a definite step to 
risk management. Banks should possess the 
credit position of the developers and the pro-
gress of the project development for exercising 
an effective risk management. Possessed with 
the information, the credibility of the develop-
ers can be classified and different credit poli-
cies can be imposed in accordance with their 
credit rating. Furthermore, the banks should 
monitor and control the mortgage applicants 
who have applied for multiple mortgages and 
a credit record system containing the credit 
history of developers and details of the real es-
tate developments must be set up. The system 
should also contain the transaction records of 
the development and the details of mortgage 
applications. An efficient presale property mar-
ket can be achieved only if the market informa-
tion can be enhanced. 
Commitment of the regulatory departments. 
Commitment of the government to safeguard 
the rights of presale property buyers is of ut-
most importance for a sustainable development 
of the presale property market. Rules and reg-
ulations have been laid out in various Law and 
Procedures such as the Administration of the 
Presale of Urban Commodity Premises. The 
local authorities should strictly adhere to the 
rules and make the regulations enforceable. 
Any unethical and illegal presale practices 
should be punished in accordance to the penal-
ties stipulated and the magnitude of the penal-
ties should be high enough to deter developers 
from unethical practices. In the mean time, 
the terms of the presale contract should also 
be standardized in order to prevent presale 
purchasers from falling into the contract traps 
made by unscrupulous developers. If necessary, 
Risk Insurance Fund should be enforced to as-
sure that once presale risks occurred, the fund 
could be used to compensate the presale prop-
erty buyers. CCA should publicize the related 
policies and help consumers understand the 
contents. Moreover, CCA should promulgate 
the set of guidelines to educate consumers the 
important issues to note, how to look for the 
relevant information and how to safeguard 
their rights in a purchase of a presale property. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS
Presales of uncompleted properties have been 
the major financing mode for real estate de-
velopments in Mainland China. However, the 
problems generated from information asymme-
try in the presale property market have caused 
public concern. Adapting the institutional ap-
proach by examining the administration and 
regulatory system employed in the market, the 
financing system and the roles played by differ-
ent market stakeholders including the central 
government, local authorities, developers and 
consumers, the root of the problems latent in 
the market have been identified. They include 
the pseudo policy objectives pursued by both 
the central government and local authorities 
which render the laid-down rules and regula-
tions ineffective, the confusing roles played by 
the market participants of CCREA and CCA 
which undertaking regulatory measures with 
no enforcing power, and the lack of informa-
tion transparency in the market. In order to 
enhance the efficiency of institutional system 
for the presale property market, attention 
should be focused on expanding the channels 
of financing for real estate development, risk 
management on both the creditability of devel-
opment as well as custody on presale proceeds 
collected. Last but not the least, commitment 
of the government to uphold the rules and reg-
ulations and to safeguard the rights of presale 
property buyers is of utmost importance for 
the long-term sustainable development of the 
presale property market.
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